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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Foreign Policy through Aid: Has United States Assistance Achieved Its  
 
Foreign Policy Objectives? 
 
 
by 
 
 
Jessica Andreasen, Master of Science 
 
Utah State University, 2014 
 
 
Major Professor: Veronica Ward 
Department: Political Science 
 
 
In looking at the history of U.S. aid, three general goals emerge: political stability, 
increased economic liberalization and expanding influence in the aid receiving country. 
While the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has measures in 
place to assess the success of its aid endeavors, most U.S. aid, in the form of economic 
and military aid, is largely unevaluated in terms of achieving these broad foreign policy 
goals. The results of this study suggest that U.S. military and economic aid fail to achieve 
these three general foreign policy objectives in a sustainable manner. Conducting a 
regression analysis of U.S. aid indicates that, in the short term, economic aid does 
succeed in promoting increased economic liberalization, but the concurrent giving of 
military aid cancels the effect. In the long term, the giving of economic aid supports the 
stability of a state’s government, but the U.S. will want to assess what other methods 
might produce similar and more enduring results at less cost. 
(50 pages) 
iv 
PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
 
 
Foreign Policy through Aid: Has United States Assistance Achieved Its  
 
Foreign Policy Objectives? 
 
 
by 
 
 
Jessica Andreasen 
 
 
Why does the U.S. give foreign aid? There are compelling humanitarian and 
economic reasons, yet the U.S. also gives large amounts of military aid. What, then, are 
the overall goals of aid giving in the post 9/11 era? In looking at the history of U.S. 
foreign aid, three general objectives emerge: political stability, increased economic 
liberalization and expanding soft power influence in the aid receiving country. While we 
can identify the motives and aims of U.S. foreign aid, little work has been done to 
evaluate the success of aid in these objectives. It is the goal of this study to assess the 
success of combined U.S. economic and military aid in accomplishing these three general 
foreign policy objectives across the case countries of Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russia and Zambia, which represent a range of aid 
beneficiaries. Using statistical analysis based on three indices, this thesis will evaluate 
whether there is a correlation between U.S. foreign aid and the attainment of these three 
broad U.S. foreign policy aims. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Foreign assistance is an essential component of our transformational diplomacy…  
to empower developing countries to strengthen security, to consolidate democracy,  
to increase trade and investment, and to improve the lives of their people…and to prevent 
future failed states like Afghanistan.” 
-Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, speech to the State Department
1
 
 
 
The giving of aid from one country to another has long been an instrument of 
influence. Aid is used as one mechanism of shaping and promoting shared security 
matters between the U.S. and it allies.
2
 During the Cold War, aid was of particular use in 
winning allies against communism and was, at times, utilized to buy U.S. support.
3
 
Studies of foreign aid suggest that the goals of aid turned to more humanitarian and 
developmental concerns with the end of the Cold War, but aid is once again in flux with 
the start of the War on Terror.
4
 It has even been suggested by some scholars in the aid 
community that aid policy during the War on Terror is reverting back to the Cold War 
dogma of using aid to buy allegiance.
5
  
Is War on Terror aid policy regressing into Cold War strategy? In a study of the 
incomes of aid-receiving countries, the prospect of a higher income country receiving aid 
has increased substantially since the Cold War and particularly during the War on 
                                                          
1
 Carol Lancaster, George Bush’s Foreign Aid: Transformation or Chaos? (Baltimore, MD: Brookings 
Institute Press, 2008), 29. 
2
 Jamey Essex, Development, Security, and Aid: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics at the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2013), 28. 
3
 Per Lundborg, “Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange,” Economics and Politics 10, 
no. 2 (1998): 127. 
4
 See Carol Lancaster, George Bush’s Foreign Aid.  
5
 Robert Fleck and Christopher Kilby, “Changing Aid Regimes? U.S. Foreign Aid from the Cold War to 
the War on Terror,” Journal of Development Economics 91 (2010): 191. 
2 
Terror.
6
 While all aid-receiving countries have benefitted from the rise in aid during the 
War on Terror, higher income countries who have less need for humanitarian or 
developmental aid, but who are more politically or strategically important to the U.S., 
have profited more.
7
 A conclusion drawn from these data is that the beginning of the War 
on Terror “corresponds to an apparent policy shift that has placed less and less emphasis 
on need (at least among core aid recipients) so that, ceteris paribus, percentage increases 
in aid to better-off countries outstripped those to poorer countries.”8 In effect, great 
changes in foreign aid policy were the result of the shifting international environment 
after the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11).
9
  
After 9/11, there was a revolution in U.S. foreign aid by the Bush administration. 
This transformation has seen substantial alterations to U.S. foreign aid, to include 
changing the purpose of aid, its policies and amounts, and even the organization of aid to 
be better included in U.S. foreign policy overall.
10
 While various aid programs have 
different specific objectives, the overall aim of U.S. aid in the twenty-first century is to 
develop foreign states such that the U.S. sphere of influence is expanded. 
Foreign aid is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy and sometimes of U.S. 
domestic policy. It is used to pursue a variety of national purposes, including 
providing humanitarian relief, furthering diplomatic goals, promoting 
development and democracy abroad, addressing global issues, supporting 
economic and political transitions, expanding export markets, preventing and 
mitigating conflict, and strengthening weak states. Of all of these, promoting 
diplomacy and development have long been the most prominent purposes of U.S. 
aid.
11
  
                                                          
6
 Robert Fleck and Christopher Kilby, “Changing Aid Regimes,” 191. 
7
 Lael Brainard, “Compassionate Conservatism Confronts Global Poverty,” Washington Quarterly 26, no. 2 
(2003): 151. 
8
 Fleck and Kilby, “Changing Aid Regimes,” 193. 
9
 Louis A. Picard and Terry F. Buss, A Fragile Balance: Re-examining the History of Foreign Aid, 
Security, and Diplomacy (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2009), 155. 
10
 Fleck and Kilby, “Changing Aid Regimes,” 1. 
11
 Lancaster, George Bush’s Foreign Aid, 3. 
3 
 
 
U.S. foreign assistance is and has been connected to political goals. As a part of 
Condoleezza Rice’s “transformational diplomacy,” these goals were to promote 
“fundamental changes in governance and institutional capacity, human capacity, and 
economic structure that enabled a country to sustain further economic and social 
progress.”12 These objectives, in a more condensed form, are political stability, increased 
economic liberalization and expanding influence in the aid receiving country. Most U.S. 
aid, in the form of economic and military aid, is largely unevaluated in terms of achieving 
these broad foreign policy goals. It is the goal of this study to assess the success of 
combined U.S. economic and military aid in accomplishing these three general foreign 
policy objectives. 
This paper will begin by giving a brief literature review and then addressing the 
scope of the subject. Understanding U.S. foreign aid is important because, while small in 
terms of percent of gross domestic product (GDP), the United States is the largest 
bilateral donor and aid can have far reaching impacts. As a leading international power, 
U.S. policies impact the shape of the global order. Therefore knowing U.S. aid policies 
and goals is critical. Additionally, if U.S. aid is being used to achieve expansive foreign 
policy goals without success, there needs to be a reassessment of the goals of U.S. foreign 
aid.  
The subsequent section will give a brief history of U.S. foreign aid followed by a 
description of the types of aid the U.S. gives as well as an explication, with evidence, of 
the broad goals of U.S. foreign aid. This section will place aid in both its recent historical 
                                                          
12
 “White Paper on U.S. Foreign Aid Policy,” USAID (Washington, DC: US Agency for International 
Development, 2004), 14. 
4 
and modern context. Furthermore, the segment will lay out the broad foreign policy 
efforts attached to U.S. aid in the post-9/11 era. This will be followed by a presentation of 
the methodology applied to determine the success or failure of these goals with an 
ensuing analysis and discussion of the results. The paper will end with a conclusion and 
suggestions for policy makers based on these findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Within the literature on foreign aid, two general branches emerge. The first looks 
at the effects of aid on the receiving countries by studying economic growth, poverty 
reduction, or other evidence of development. The second camp studies the determinants 
of aid by reviewing what donors give and to whom. For example, authors Casella and 
Eichengreen study the effects of foreign aid in economic stabilization and conclude that 
aid is only successful early in the economic event and under specific contexts.
13
 In a large 
sample of developing countries, Boone studies the economic impacts of foreign aid and 
finds that aid has no effect on investment or growth. In fact, Boone concludes that foreign 
aid leads to higher consumption rather than investment.
14
 In a similar study looking at 
whether foreign aid contributes to growth, Easterly finds only failed projects.
15
 In a well-
known study by Burnside and Dollar, they conclude that foreign aid is effective when 
given to countries with good policies (ie: good governance and stable policies) already in 
place.
16
  
For the purpose of this study, the investigation into the determinants of aid, 
essentially who gives aid and why, is the more salient for our interests. The reasons for 
giving aid are complex and varied. In a study on who receives aid and why, the focus of 
authors Maizels and Nissanke is largely on the strategic intentions of the donor in the 
                                                          
13
 Alessandra Casella and Barry Eichengreen, “Can Foreign Aid Accelerate Stabilisation?” The Economic 
Journal 106, no. 436 (1996): 605, 617. An Economic Event can refer to high inflation, budget deficits 
and/or rapid monetization.   
14
 Peter Boone, “Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid,” European Economic Review 40 (1996). 
15
 William Easterly, “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 3 (2003). 
16
 Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” The American Economic Review 90, no. 
4 (2000). 
6 
giving of bilateral aid.
17
 Similarly, McKinlay and Little also conduct a cross-country 
regression to uncover the determinants of aid. They find that the donor’s interests are the 
primary explanatory variable in bilateral aid.
18
 As mentioned above, Burnside and Dollar 
find that aid is only effective when given to countries with good policies already in place. 
However, they also note in their results that aid flows are a result of a donor’s strategic 
interests and not the quality of policies in the receiving countries.
19
 
Alesina and Dollar use donor-recipient interest variables such as military arms 
sales and colonial ties to determine aid allocation motives. They conclude that political 
and strategic interests are an essential variable in explaining aid flows.
20
 While the 
definition of strategic interests varies from study to study, the consensus is that strategic 
and commercial aims account for much of the motives in aid giving.
21
  In a regression 
analysis of aid data from 1948 to 1979, Lundborg concludes that the U.S. and Soviet 
Union used aid to encourage international support.
22
 Since the start of the War on Terror, 
Woods has noted the trend of U.S. aid being earmarked for security imperatives and 
countries of geostrategic importance.
23
  
Rather than trying to discuss and summarize every study of aid determinants, this 
paper will illustrate the main issue that arises from this literature, namely that the United 
                                                          
17
 Alfred Maizels and Machiko K. Nissanke, “Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries,” World 
Development 12 (1984). 
18
 R. McKinlay and R. Little, “A Foreign Policy Model of US Bilateral Aid Allocation,” World Politics 30, 
no. 1 (1977). 
19
 Burnside and Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth.” 
20
 Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of Economic 
Growth 5 (2000). 
21
 Fleck and Kilby, “Changing Aid Regimes?”; and McKinlay and Little, “A Foreign Policy Model of US 
Bilateral Aid Allocation.” Strategic interests can include increased trade or commercial ventures, placement 
of military bases, favorable preference for U.S. economic enterprises, and/or support for ongoing or future 
U.S. endeavors such as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
22
 Lundborg, “Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange.” 
23
 Ngaire Woods, “The Shifting Politics of Foreign Aid,” International Affairs 81, no. 2 (2005): 400. 
7 
States gives aid for broad foreign policy objectives without knowing if they will succeed. 
There is no disagreement in the foreign aid literature that aid is given for strategic 
purposes. In what follows, the focus is on discerning what the broad objectives of U.S. 
aid giving were during the War on Terror. For that purpose, the emphasis is on bilateral 
U.S. aid to a small sample of countries. The objective is to determine the success or 
failure of broad U.S. foreign policy goals for aid during the War on Terror based on the 
premise that aid is given for strategic purposes.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
SCOPE 
 
While the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has 
measures in place to assess the success of its aid endeavors, most U.S. aid (in the form of 
economic and military aid) is largely unevaluated in terms of the achievement of the 
previously mentioned foreign policy goals. It is the goal of this study to evaluate the 
success of combined U.S. economic and military aid in the accomplishment of these three 
general foreign policy objectives. Government agencies in the U.S., including USAID, 
have typically placed a five to ten year expectancy on seeing results for foreign 
assistance. For that reason, data from the years 2002 through 2011 (the last year for 
which reliable data on U.S. aid levels and indices of the three goals are available) will be 
utilized.  
For definitional purposes, foreign aid is “money transferred on concessionary 
terms by the governments of rich countries to the governments of poor countries.”24 
However, there also exists a more nuanced definition of international assistance. 
“International assistance is the transfer of any resources (grants of money and 
concessionary – less than market rate – loans), the provision of goods and services, and 
technical assistance, including military assistance.”25 For the remainder of this paper, the 
terms foreign aid and international assistance will be used interchangeably based on the 
more comprehensive definition for international assistance. 
                                                          
24
 Paul Mosley, Overseas Aid: Its Defense and Reform (Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987), 3. 
25
 Picard and Buss, A Fragile Balance, 6. 
9 
For policy and implementation, the U.S. uses state-to-state foreign aid.
26
 
Therefore states will be evaluated in this analysis. For this study, ten case countries will 
be evaluated: Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russia 
and Zambia. These case countries were chosen because they represent a range of U.S. aid 
beneficiaries. Five of these case countries, Georgia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, and 
Zambia, are mid-tier aid recipients.  
The remaining five case countries, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan and Russia, are 
in the top seven of U.S. aid beneficiaries across the years 2002 to 2011.
27
 The top two aid 
beneficiary countries, an anomaly attributed to the War on Terror, are Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Data for these two countries is difficult to obtain or do not exist and are therefore 
excluded from this analysis. Furthermore, while the high aid levels of Egypt and Israel 
are due to the Camp David Accords and Israel’s special relationship with the United 
States, these case countries are not expected to impact the results as country fixed effects 
will be included.
28
  
Country fixed effects assist in controlling for unobserved differences which may 
correlate with the independent variables. In effect, there could be natural differences 
between these case countries that are correlated with the independent variables. This 
constant can be removed from the data by using country dummy variables, or fixed 
                                                          
26
 Picard and Buss, A Fragile Balance, 273. 
27
 “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations (Greenbook),” USAID, last 
modified September 30, 2011, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/ 
28
 For this study, population and case country GDP were used as country fixed effects.  
10 
effects.
29
 For this study, case country population and gross domestic product (GDP) were 
used. 
To support the analysis, three metrics which measure the political stability in a 
beneficiary country, the economic liberalization of that country, and also the extent of 
U.S. influence as it pertains to the global political landscape for each case country will be 
utilized. These scales will permit the recognition of a measure of the success or failure of 
U.S. economic and military aid for each goal. From this information we can draw 
inferences and make suggestions for policy changes or for future research to determine 
why certain goals were successful or not. I posit that the amount of combined economic 
and military aid will have little relevance to the success of these goals and that more 
nuanced future research will be necessary to determine the true algorithm to achieve 
success in foreign policy aims through aid. 
 
Objective 
 
 This research is a starting point for the evaluation of U.S. foreign aid. Agencies 
such as USAID and the World Bank have long measured the success of humanitarian aid 
projects, but no inquiries have been made into the accomplishment of broad U.S. foreign 
policy goals through economic and military aid.  Having an assessment of the three main 
aid objectives would direct future researchers to look at the nuances of why foreign aid 
policy objectives were or were not met. This paper takes a U.S. centered approach as it 
specifically looks at U.S. foreign policy and foreign aid to provide feedback for U.S. 
policy makers.  
                                                          
29
 Badi H. Baltagi, Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, 4th ed. (Sussex, UK: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 
2008). 
11 
While this paper presents a short-term analysis, it is a beginning point for the 
understudied area of foreign policy objectives of U.S. foreign aid. Some overarching 
goals of U.S. aid and U.S. aid policies have remained largely unchanged for decades. If 
foreign aid is failing to achieve its objectives, it needs to be noted and either ameliorated 
or abandoned to new policy goals for aid. In addition, this study and future studies in this 
area will serve as a compass to guide the United States and to direct U.S. aid and energies 
into endeavors where foreign aid is likely to be impactful. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN AID 
 
 
History of U.S. Foreign Aid 
 
The United States’ global goals and foreign policy objectives are shaped by the 
past. Woodrow Wilson’s progressive liberal vision was to promote human rights and 
prevent future human suffering by uniting countries under a system for the resolution of 
disagreements. While the League of Nations ultimately failed, later Presidents such as 
Roosevelt and Truman believed in the global unity ideas of Wilson. It was thought that an 
international order of shared security and economic advancement could help prevent 
future wars.
30
  This led the United States to advocate for a global order with established 
rules.   
[The United States’ current] foreign aid regime originated during the ideological 
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Western aid 
system began formally in 1961 with the establishment of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development). Using aid to encourage recipients to align 
themselves with the Western camp, OECD donors also hoped to deter any 
experiments with socialism.
31
   
 
It was during and, in particular, after the Cold War that a U.S.-led global order 
was born, with foreign aid one tool of continuing influence and control. During the Cold 
War period, U.S. foreign assistance, or combined economic and military aid, was directed 
at specific countries or regions in the ideological and strategic battle for supremacy. 
These areas were targeted because they were seen as important in the American-Soviet 
                                                          
30
 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World 
Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 191. 
31
 Richard Grant and Jan Nijman, “The Foreign Aid Regime in Flux: Crisis or Transition?” In The Global 
Crisis in Foreign Aid: Space, Place, and Society, ed. Richard Grant and Jan Nijman. (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 1998), 5-6. 
13 
struggle for global influence.
32
 The main focus of aid was to win states away from the 
Soviet sphere of influence and increase the number of U.S. allied supporters. In effect, 
aid was premised on the goal of motivating states to combine their security with and 
under the leadership of the U.S.
33
 
Historically, the U.S.-led global economy differs slightly from the global 
economy as a whole in that U.S. administrations encourage other states to become 
members of U.S. produced organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), or the World Bank. 
Moreover, the U.S. pushes for economies and enterprises to be non-state-owned and for 
markets to be open with low trade barriers, to promote the sale of U.S. products abroad, 
particularly in agriculture.
34
 Increasing bilateral trade with the U.S. is a hallmark of the 
promotion of the U.S.-led global economy. These ideas are premised on Hegemonic 
Stability Theory, a predominant view in U.S. international relations, which states that the 
presence of a hegemonic power creates a more stable international system.
35
  
The policy position of Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) reflects a post-World 
War II belief held by both academics and policy makers that a stable international system 
requires the presence of a hegemonic power. HST hypothesizes that the absence of such a 
power will result in a repeat of the Great Depression of the 1930s when no one was 
willing or able to establish rules necessary to regulate the international system. Whether 
this position is still relevant or not is an empirical question. However, Robert Keohane 
                                                          
32
 Essex, Development, Security, and Aid, 28. 
33
 Ibid.  
34
 Alfred E. Eckes, The Contemporary Global Economy: A History Since 1980 (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011). 
35
 For a full review of Hegemonic Stability Theory, see Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 
1929-1939 (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2013). 
14 
uses the ideas of Charles Kindleberger, the founder of HST, and G. John Ikenberry 
credits that U.S. policy makers, while certainly pushing for U.S. interests, still hold to this 
premise. 
Thinking back on the ideas of Wilson, Roosevelt and Truman, they and other 
American elites held the belief that having a unified global system would improve the 
lives of everyone. This unified global system, or American hegemony, was centered on 
the idea that economic integration and political development were linked with and would 
lead to western notions of development.
36
 Essentially, the belief was that progressively 
more world regions would join the capitalist system and assimilate to the social and 
political ideologies of the west, leaders at that time in the emerging global order.
37
  
In order to achieve the dream of Wilson, Roosevelt and Truman, the United States 
believed it would need to maintain ongoing “involvement in keeping the order open, 
stable, and loosely rule-based” through the use of mechanisms such as aid.38 The 
international economy became regionalized with the Cold War, and this was opposed to 
U.S. goals.
39
 Only after the end of the Cold War did the international economy become 
more integrated. 
While there are many ways to categorize different periods of aid giving, I have 
chosen to use three broad periods for better comprehension and simplicity. These three 
periods of aid are the Cold War period, the inter-war period, and the War on Terror 
period. During the Cold War period, roughly 1955 to 1989, U.S. aid was used as a 
geopolitical tool to influence countries to ally with the U.S. and to adopt free market 
                                                          
36
 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, 191. 
37
 Ibid., 190. 
38
 Ibid., 192. 
39
 Eckes, The Contemporary Global Economy, 35. 
15 
capitalism. During the Cold War, aid averaged $16.0 billion per year.
40
 U.S. aid averaged 
“$15.2 billion during the 12 inter-war years (1990-2001) and $25.0 billion during the first 
five years of the War on Terror (2002-2006).”41  
 As a general overview of aid policy, aid before the Cold War, from World War II 
to the 1960’s, was given as capital in order to promote global equality. The idea was that 
if a country was given capital, and thus increased their GDP, they could pull themselves 
up by their bootstraps, as it were. Beginning in the 1960’s aid’s intent switched to 
strategic ends in the fight against communism. In the inter-war years, the purpose of aid 
shifted away from strategic aims towards humanitarian objectives.
42
 In the 1990’s, the 
object of aid was once more global equality and humanitarian uses, but its vehicle was 
celebrity causes and non-governmental organization (NGO) delivery. Recent trends 
during the War on Terror suggest the goals of aid are once again shifting towards Cold 
War patterns.
43
 
Since the start of the War on Terror, aid levels have soared with the result of an 
increase in aid across the board. Nonetheless, the importance of need has been in steady 
decline since the advent of the War on Terror.
44
 New allotments of U.S. foreign aid have 
been going to strategically important countries, namely Iraq and Afghanistan, both of 
which were targets of U.S. interventions. What is more, the Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA), designed to aid low income countries, was expanded by the Bush 
administration in 2002 to include middle income countries of strategic importance to the 
                                                          
40
 Fleck and Kilby, “Changing Aid Regimes?” 187. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Ann Boschini and Anders Olofsgárd, “Foreign Aid: An Instrument for Fighting Communism?” Journal 
of Development Studies 43, no. 4 (2007). 
43
 Fleck and Kilby, “Changing Aid Regimes?” 191. 
44
 Ibid., 187.  
16 
U.S. such as Jordan, Egypt and Russia. This move, the giving of MCA aid to these 
strategically important countries, is seen as a reward for these countries siding with the 
U.S. in the War on Terror.
45
  
 
Forms of U.S. Foreign Aid 
 
 
 The United States gives many forms of aid. However, aid is usually categorized 
into two general groups: economic and military. U.S. economic aid for the years 2002 
through 2012 totaled 313 billion USD and military aid for those years totaled 128 billion 
USD.
46
  “Economic aid entails development aid managed by the USAID, food aid, the 
Peace Corps, credits for exports, disaster assistance, and the so-called Economic Support 
Fund (ESF).” 47 Military aid, as the name implies, deals exclusively with U.S. military 
dealings. It “includes grants for the purchase of military equipment, credit financing of 
military sales, and military education and training.”48 
 Military aid is more straightforward than economic aid.  Military aid serves both 
U.S. geopolitical goals, such as reinforcing U.S. partners around the world, as well as 
promoting U.S. commercial interests.
49
 In effect, military aid is given to fortify the hard 
power of U.S. allies, to reinforce the beneficiary country’s ties to the U.S., and to directly 
support U.S. commercial interests in the manufacture and sale of military equipment.  
                                                          
45
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 Economic aid, in comparison, is much less transparent and also more complex. 
While one goal of economic aid is to encourage development in the recipient country, 
other purposes for giving economic aid are to advance the security interests or the 
economic well-being of the donor.
50
 Frequently, economic assistance serves U.S. 
geostrategic aims. The ESF, for example, which is supposed to help fund large 
infrastructure development projects, is often given to geostrategic countries for the 
purpose of security rather than economic development. This can be demonstrated by the 
fact that ESF was given to countries of political importance to the U.S. such as Israel, 
Egypt, Pakistan and the Philippines.
51
 
While categorizing the two groups would make aid appear to be a transparent 
issue, where and why the funds are actually disbursed is complex. In fact, “receiving U.S. 
military aid is linked to a doubling of U.S. economic aid.”52 Additionally, tying aid to 
specific foreign policy objectives can be difficult because of the diffuse and versatile 
functions of aid. For example, military aid often runs counter to economic aid in that it is 
not meant to further economic freedom and development. However, for the purpose of 
this research, overall U.S. aid will be measured as supporting all three foreign policy 
objectives despite military aid. 
 
Purpose of U.S. Foreign Aid 
 
 
The United States groups aid into economic and military blocs, but the overall 
goal of aid is the same. Considerable evidence exists showing aid to be motivated by 
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political, strategic and even welfare interests of the donor rather than the widespread 
myth that aid is primarily meant to assist the poor.
53
 More specifically, the purpose of 
U.S. aid is to increase economic collaboration between countries in the hopes of 
encouraging political constancy and more favorable relations between countries.  U.S. 
leaders recognize the role of the hegemon in this endeavor.
54
   
Not incidentally, the initiative and released enterprise of an expanded private 
sector is presumed by most Western economists – and by many in the developing 
countries as well – to provide an unrivaled means of spurring economic growth. 
The gains are, in turn, thought to promote political stability and, through this, 
close ties and favorable attitudes toward the aid donors and their economic 
systems.
55
 
 
 
 With the Global War on Terror (GWoT), have the goals of aid changed? An 
Action Aid report on the distorting impact of the GWoT on aid flows notes that, similar 
to the Cold War, aid flows during the War on Terror are tied to a single purpose.
56
 The 
War on Terror, or “long war,” is compared to the Cold War as a global, zero-sum 
ideational struggle.
57
 In comparison to Cold War U.S. aid, aid flows are again intended to 
create support for the U.S. in the War on Terror and the U.S.-led global order. 
While aid levels have increased substantially during the War on Terror, the main 
purposes for giving aid have remained steadfast with the additional aid going towards 
projects and imperatives that benefit U.S. security requirements after 9/11.
58
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Conspicuously, it is bilateral aid that is most affected by donor interests.
59
 That is to say 
that increasing aid levels during the War on Terror have encompassed considerable funds 
for central allies including Jordan and Pakistan.
60
 Most of the changes in aid allocation 
occurring during the GWoT are to countries of strategic significance.
61
 These aid 
payments have propped up regimes as a bulwark in the War on Terror. 
There are many secondary goals of foreign aid. The United States has at times 
worked to promote democracy and it has demonstrated commitments to humanitarian 
efforts, particularly in efforts to eradicate polio, and reduce smallpox and infant 
mortality.
62
 Nonetheless, it is the views of elites that prevail in debates of foreign 
policy.
63
 In the elitist perspective, security concerns are predominant in the post-
September 11 environment and foreign aid policy was transformed to meet the changing 
security needs of the United States. While foreign aid is still given towards humanitarian 
endeavors, according to Bob Woodward, the change in U.S. foreign aid by the Bush 
administration neglected previous aims such as humanitarian assistance programs and the 
spread of American values such as democracy.
64
 The transformation of U.S. foreign aid 
post-9/11 has been to support U.S. security concerns. 
With aid based largely on the interests of the donor country, what are the interests 
of the United States?  The 2002 National Security Strategy “commits the U.S. to ‘actively 
work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every 
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corner of the world.’”65  The desire to expand the U.S.-led global order, predominantly 
through economic means, results in the emergence of three general goals for U.S. aid. 
These objectives are political stability, increased economic liberalization and enhancing 
U.S. influence in the aid receiving country. Subsequent sections will address each goal in 
more detail.  
 
Political Stability 
Many authors make the argument that the United States gives aid to democratic 
countries or to promote democracy.
66
 Past studies have shown the U.S. to be more partial 
to democracies over non-democracies.
67
 Nonetheless, it is also apparent that the U.S. 
does not stop aid to non-democratic regimes, particularly when non-democratic regimes 
support the GWoT.
68
 The broader goal of U.S. aid in general is to ensure stability.  
Stability, or the continuation of regimes known to the U.S., has always been an 
international goal. However, with the advent of the War on Terror, state stability has 
taken on particular salience. Fueled by the belief from elites that poor or failed states act 
as sanctuary and even breeding grounds for terrorists, political stability has become a 
vital goal of foreign aid.
69
 In fact, the belief that failed or failing states offer a potential 
harbor to terrorists has made them a main concern of the Bush administration. As a result, 
state failure is a main priority in the Global War on Terror.
70
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Failed states are viewed by the U.S. as a direct threat to winning the War on 
Terror. Indeed, increased funding for Department of Defense (DOD) aid programs is also 
to be used for stabilization and community development projects, such as building 
schools and mentoring city councils.
71
 Political stability is a goal of U.S. assistance as the 
U.S. government wants the steadiness and continuation of foreign governments that are 
willing to work with the United States. One means of promoting stability is economic and 
trade agreements, which have built in processes to mediate economic conflicts and 
therefore also holds the power to ease political pressures. Many of these agreements, such 
as MERCOSUR (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Venezuela and Uruguay) and the African 
Union are supported by the U.S.
72
 
The maintenance of a stable world order is in the interests of the United States. 
Having foreign regimes that are predictable and willing to work with the U.S. ensures the 
U.S.’ ability to continue to pursue its global aims. Having stable governments preserves 
the status-quo of a U.S.-led global order. Political upheaval in other countries does not 
just pose a problem to maintenance of the U.S.-led global order, it also impacts trade 
flows. The United State depends on global trade flows to continue enticing countries into 
the U.S. driven global economic structure. 
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Economic Freedom 
 
Economic liberalization is a goal of the U.S. meant to promote the global liberal 
market model, or classical liberalism. In essence, the aim is to lessen government 
economic restrictions in order to increase private ownership. This is thought to lead to 
increased trade and economic interdependence, resulting in less conflict. This is based on 
Norman Angell’s 1910 book, The Great Illusion, which makes the case that economic 
interdependence promotes peace.
73
  
 The United States’ desire for economic liberalization is a direct legacy of 
Presidents Wilson, Roosevelt and Truman. Having countries economically 
interdependent is thought to reduce the instances of conflict between countries as they are 
united by trade. The influence of open market economists on American elites still persists 
today. Promoting the laissez-faire attitude are the American Enterprise Institute (founded 
1954), the Heritage Foundation (founded 1973) and the Cato Institute (founded 1977), all 
in Washington, DC.
74
  
Additionally, the current global economic system is dominated by the United 
States and having more countries involved in the order expands the influence of the U.S. 
According to Maizels and Nissanke, the interests of the donor country are in stimulating 
growth and/or easing economic difficulties in the trade partner countries in order to 
expand the market for exports or to secure its sources of imports.
75
 In this instance, 
economic liberalization is seen to not only benefit the U.S. through increasing markets 
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for its products, but it is also perceived as aiding the domestic economy of the aid 
receiving country.  
 
Global Influence/ United Nations Voting 
 
The third target, global influence or soft power, is defined by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. as 
the U.S.’s ability to get what it wants “through attraction rather than coercion or 
payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and 
policies.”76  The goal of increasing U.S. soft power is to enlarge the U.S. sphere of 
influence. The belief is that any single country requires the backing of others to be seen 
as not only legitimate, but as a global leader. Therefore the U.S. has an incentive to 
utilize aid as a political tool to achieve the needed support.
77
 The United States desires 
global reach and the ability to influence global matters. Having such a position would 
allow the U.S. to perpetuate the U.S.-led global order. 
In an effort to maintain its global influence, the U.S. utilizes the United Nations as 
a pulpit to affect and guide other countries. U.N. votes have been found to be a consistent 
gauge of the political relationship between countries and these alliances help determine 
flows of foreign aid.
78
 In fact, when it comes to the U.N. Security Council, “a country’s 
U.S. aid increases by 59 percent and its U.N. aid by 8 percent when it rotates onto the 
council.”79 The results of the study by Kuziemko and Werker demonstrate that U.N. 
Security Council membership also impacts foreign aid flows. When a country is selected 
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to join the Security Council, incoming foreign aid increases steeply and remains high 
throughout their Security Council term. Only after the term ends do aid levels abruptly 
return to pre-Security Council levels.
80
 This demonstrates that U.N. votes are one area of 
particular interest for the U.S. as it pertains to influence.   
This is not to say that U.N. voting is the only area where the U.S. wishes to 
expand its impact. As previously mentioned, a goal of U.S. aid is to expand U.S. 
economic reach to ensure capitalism, and its champion, the United States, remain integral 
parts of the global economy and global system. Soft power and alliances can be military-
strategic or commercial, or both, when it comes to increasing the U.S. sphere of 
influence.
81
 U.N. voting patterns are correlated with both country relationships and 
having parallel political and economic interests. It is therefore no surprise that “donors 
favor their ‘friends’ in disbursing aid, and an observable manifestation of ‘friendship’ is 
the pattern of UN votes.”82 This suggests that U.N. voting is one observable expression of 
soft power. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to assess the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and foreign policy 
objectives, I will be using a least-squared test to conduct a regression analysis of the data. 
Because we would expect to see the results of aid the year after the aid is given, data for 
the independent variable, or aid, will be lagged by one year from the dependent variable. 
However, foreign aid experts typically expect to see the results of aid 5 to 10 years after 
initiating an aid program. For that reason, a second regression, lagging aid by five years, 
will also be analyzed. A country fixed effects model is used to control for differences 
between case countries that might influence aid. I use the statistical software program 
STATA to determine if any relationship is statistically significant. Data for the regression 
analysis will come from existing metrics. 
To measure political stability in each country I will be using the State Fragility 
Index and Matrix from the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP). This index uses multiple 
variables to infer a state’s stability.83 To rate increased economic liberalization, I will be 
using the Index of Economic Freedom developed by The Heritage Institute in 
collaboration with The Wall Street Journal. This index measures various elements that 
are then combined into four broad categories that quantify economic liberalization.
84
 For 
the third scale, measuring U.S. influence/ soft power, I will make use of non-consensus 
voting in the United Nations. U.S. influence, in particular, will be difficult to assess and I 
have necessarily chosen to look at only one index in order to quantify the sway of the 
U.S. on other countries.  
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Limitations 
By limiting the variables to a single scale for each foreign policy objective, the 
chances of realization in every category are narrowed because each broad goal will 
naturally contain many elements. However, these scales are designed to present a raw 
gauge of success or failure for each objective and are not an exact prediction. There are 
many possible variables to measure each category and I am measuring but a few. This 
was necessary for the brevity of the research and because not all mediums of each goal 
are measurable. Soft power, in particular, is difficult to measure.
85
 Nonetheless, this study 
is able to overcome some of these limitations by choosing indices that are representative 
of each of the major U.S. foreign policy goals.    
Another limitation of this study is the choice to use a lagged model instead of a 
change score model. A change score model has its strengths, such as controlling for 
measurement error, but the lagged model was chosen for specific reasons. In this case, 
aid is given to generate a change or result in the receiving country. This means that aid 
can be, in part, based on the aid receiving country’s output. If a country is not stable, U.S. 
aid might increase to that country to assist in stability efforts. Because the result has a 
causal effect on the input of aid, the change score model would overestimate the negative 
effects.
86
 
An additional drawback to this study is the potential for omitted variables. Of 
particular note may be external economic or political factors affecting a state’s economic 
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growth and/or political stability.
87
 Once more, this was necessary for the brevity of the 
research and because not all mechanisms affecting each objective are easily discernable 
or measurable. I have, consequently, attempted to select a representative method of 
measuring each aim of aid in order to gain a broader picture of the success of U.S. aid in 
general. Additional research and better data are necessary. However, it is possible to draw 
important conclusions from the existing variables and available data, demonstrating the 
significance of this research despite its small scope. 
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U.S. Foreign Aid to Case Countries 
 
Table 1 - U.S. Economic and Military Aid by Country, 2002 – 2011 
 
 
YEAR 
 
                                       Economic, 
COUNTRY                   Military & 
                                               Combined Aid 
  
Egypt 
 
 
Georgia 
 
Israel 
 
Jordan 
 
Mexico 
 
Pakistan 
 
Peru 
 
Philippines 
 
Russia 
 
Zambia 
2002 1106.6 
1598.7 
2705.3 
 
108.7 
133.6 
242.3 
892.7 
2532.0 
3424.7 
290.3 
125.4 
415.7 
94.4 
23.6 
118.0 
947.9 
93.9 
1041.8 
322.9 
16.3 
339.3 
134.3 
69.4 
203.7 
512.1 
79.5 
591.7 
88.4 
0.2 
88.7 
2003 552.7 
1570.0 
2122.7 
 
106.2 
11.0 
117.2 
796.2 
3718.3 
4514.5 
1270.3 
772.4 
2042.7 
67.2 
18.0 
85.1 
387.8 
318.0 
705.8 
266.3 
12.4 
278.7 
179.7 
65.2 
244.9 
840.5 
68.6 
909.1 
79.4 
0.4 
79.7 
2004 779.6 
1547.7 
2327.3 
 
130.4 
15.9 
146.3 
653.8 
2542.7 
3196.5 
479.7 
253.4 
733.1 
98.0 
12.9 
110.9 
410.6 
101.7 
512.2 
 
308.3 
10.7 
319.0 
169.7 
44.7 
214.4 
1043.7 
84.1 
1127.8 
120.1 
0.5 
120.7 
2005 309.7 
1472.3 
1782.1 
 
109.1 
15.6 
124.7 
548.2 
2537.5 
3085.7 
427.1 
349.5 
776.5 
104.8 
12.4 
117.2 
494.1 
367.3 
861.4 
194.9 
8.3 
203.1 
146.3 
43.5 
189.8 
1737.9 
85.4 
1823.2 
163.0 
0.4 
163.4 
2006 548.0 
1431.4 
1979.4 
 
406.0 
15.4 
421.4 
314.3 
2483.2 
2797.4 
364.1 
232.4 
596.5 
187.1 
16.7 
203.8 
693.7 
359.8 
1053.5 
359.1 
13.1 
372.2 
192.7 
41.1 
233.8 
1531.6 
174.9 
1706.6 
214.0 
0.3 
214.3 
2007 716.9 
1392.1 
2109.0 
 
95.8 
11.8 
107.6 
179.5 
2501.4 
2680.9 
354.4 
225.2 
579.6 
77.3 
16.6 
93.9 
668.8 
372.8 
1041.6 
167.5 
8.6 
176.0 
112.7 
46.8 
159.5 
1585.5 
134.2 
1719.6 
221.8 
0.3 
222.0 
2008 310.3 
1347.5 
1657.8 
 
138.4 
10.5 
148.9 
46.3 
2485.8 
2532.1 
599.1 
314.6 
913.7 
86.7 
13.1 
99.8 
568.3 
448.8 
1017.1 
157.5 
11.5 
169.1 
135.9 
33.7 
169.6 
1427.8 
78.5 
1506.3 
276.9 
0.5 
277.4 
2009 502.6 
1339.3 
1841.9 
 
606.0 
13.9 
620.0 
41.5 
2452.4 
2493.9 
590.9 
245.0 
836.0 
444.4 
70.0 
514.4 
1387.9 
495.0 
1883.0 
145.3 
10.3 
155.6 
157.2 
38.0 
195.2 
477.9 
77.2 
555.1 
303.6 
0.4 
304.0 
2010 405.1 
1327.6 
1732.7 
 
427.8 
18.2 
446.0 
37.0 
2856.3 
2893.3 
472.2 
309.8 
782.0 
633.4 
97.9 
731.3 
2036.2 
945.7 
2981.8 
192.2 
24.4 
216.6 
206.5 
36.3 
242.8 
426.8 
89.5 
516.3 
343.8 
0.4 
344.2 
2011 172.5 
1298.7 
1471.2 
95.1 
18.0 
113.0 
31.3 
2995.1 
3026.4 
531.6 
319.2 
850.8 
317.5 
93.7 
411.2 
1026.9 
673.2 
1700.1 
128.6 
13.0 
141.6 
584.5 
26.3 
610.8 
88.9 
41.6 
130.4 
322.8 
0.4 
323.2 
Amount in millions, constant 2011 U.S. Dollars 
Source: U.S. Overseas Grants and Loans (Greenbook)
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DATA 
 
State Fragility 
Part of the foundation of the U.S.-led order is global peace and stability. The 
United States relies heavily on the global economic system remaining open and 
prosperous to secure its position as the global hegemon. When states are not at war, they 
are better equipped to develop their economies and to increase trade. It is consequently a 
foreign policy objective, and a goal of aid, to reinforce stability in countries around the 
globe. The War on Terror has placed significance on stability as a means of reducing and 
preventing terrorism.
89
 
State Fragility is a complex issue and requires a complex calculation to measure 
it. To measure political stability in each country the State Fragility Index and Matrix from 
the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) is used. This index uses multiple variables to infer a 
state’s stability. In particular, the index measures political “effectiveness and legitimacy 
across four distinct dimensions: security, governance, economic development, and social 
development.”90  The idea for this matrix was originally a product of the University of 
Maryland at the request of USAID. It is designed to measure a country’s fragility in terms 
of the government’s ability to manage conflict, create and execute public policy, and to 
deliver essential services. It also looks at systemic and domestic level variables such as 
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system coherence and quality of life, as well as the government’s ability to effectively 
respond to crisis and its capability to maintain development.
91
    
State Fragility is based on a 25 point scale measuring the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the four indices: security, politics, economics and social factors. According 
to the Center for Systemic Peace, country scores are derived from both effectiveness and 
legitimacy in four performance areas: security, politics, economics and social. Each of 
these four dimensions is assessed on a four-point fragility scale, with scoring as follows: 
0 ‘no fragility,’ 1 ‘low fragility,’ 2 ‘medium fragility,’ and 3 ‘high fragility,’ with an 
exception for Economic Effectiveness, which is rated on a five-point fragility scale to 
include 4 ‘extreme fragility.’92  
The Center for System Peace creates the State Fragility Index and Matrix by 
combining scores from these indicators and gives each country a score ranging from 0 or 
“no fragility” to 25 or “extreme fragility.” The index is compiled by researchers at the 
Center. Table 2 lists the state fragility scores for the case countries for the period 2002 to 
2012.  
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Case Country State Fragility Scores  
 
Table 2 - State Fragility Index Scores by Country, 2002 – 2012 
 
 
YEAR 
 
 
COUNTRY  
  
Egypt 
 
 
Georgia 
 
Israel 
 
Jordan 
 
Mexico 
 
Pakistan 
 
Peru 
 
Philippines 
 
Russia 
 
Zambia 
2002 
 
 
12 
 
11 9 6 4 17 12 12 12 18 
2003 
 
 
13 
 
12 9 6 4 16 12 12 11 18 
2004 
 
 
12 10 9 6 5 15 12 12 11 19 
2005 
 
 
13 
 
9 8 6 5 16 12 12 10 18 
2006 
 
 
13 
 
6 8 6 5 15 11 12 8 18 
2007 
 
 
13 
 
8 8 6 3 16 8 12 8 17 
2008 
 
 
13 
 
8 9 5 4 16 7 12 8 16 
2009 
 
 
13 
 
8 9 5 4 16 8 12 8 15 
2010 
 
 
12 
 
7 8 5 4 15 7 11 7 14 
2011 
 
 
12 
 
8 8 6 5 16 7 11 7 14 
2012 
 
 
11 8 8 7 5 16 6 11 7 14 
State Fragility Index = Effectiveness Score + Legitimacy Score (25 points),  
0 = no fragility, 25 = extreme fragility
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Source: Center for Systemic Peace 
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Economic Freedom 
Current U.S. development ideas are built on the belief that capitalism and 
integration into the U.S.-led capitalist economic system are what lead to economic 
growth, which results in development. 
94
 Additionally, the U.S.-led capitalist system 
greatly benefits the United States. It is therefore unsurprising that economics plays a 
central role in U.S. foreign policy. By incorporating more and more countries into the 
U.S. global economy, it is the goal of the United States to integrate these states into the 
U.S.-led order. By providing economic aid, the U.S. believes it can incorporate more 
countries into the global economy and thereby increase their reliance on and position in 
the current global order.  
As with political stability, continued U.S. leadership relies on the global economic 
system remaining open and prosperous. This neoliberal ideology has come to be known 
as the Washington Consensus, which favors financial deregulation and market 
integration.
95
 It can be surmised, therefore, that the economic goal of foreign aid for the 
past decade has been to deregulate and integrate markets into the global economy.  
The Index of Economic Freedom, a collaborative project between The Wall Street 
Journal and The Heritage Foundation, looks at deregulation and market integration in its’ 
assessment of economic freedom. This index is used by the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC) to measure a country’s economic freedom to determine their 
eligibility funding. This instrument has measured economic freedom since 1995 “by 
creating 10 benchmarks that gauge the economic success of 185 countries around the 
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world.”96 While these variables are politically charged, they represent the neoliberal 
approach to the market and the limited role of the state. According to The Heritage 
Foundation, each of the ten components is equally weighted and measured on a scale 
from 0 to 100, with 100 representing maximum freedom. The ten components are 
grouped into four broad categories:
97
  
Rule of Law (property rights, freedom from corruption) 
Limited Government (fiscal freedom, government spending) 
Regulatory Efficiency (business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom) 
Open Markets (trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom) 
 
While each of the freedoms in these categories is individually scored on a scale 
from 0 to 100, a country’s total economic freedom grade is determined by averaging its 
scores from the 10 individual freedoms listed above. 
98
 Hence, the overall scale ranges 
from 0 to 100 with a higher score denoting that a country is more economically free. A 
perfect score of economic freedom would, therefore, be 100. Table 3 denotes the 
economic freedom scores for each case country for the period 2002 to 2012.  
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Case Country Economic Freedom Scores 
 
Table 3 - Economic Freedom Scores by Country, 2002 -2012 
 
 
YEAR 
 
 
COUNTRY  
  
Egypt 
 
 
Georgia 
 
Israel 
 
Jordan 
 
Mexico 
 
Pakistan 
 
Peru 
 
Philippines 
 
Russia 
 
Zambia 
2002 
 
 
54.1 
 
56.7 66.9 66.2 63.0 55.8 64.8 60.7 48.7 59.6 
2003 
 
 
55.3 
 
58.6 62.7 65.3 65.3 55.0 64.6 61.3 50.8 55.3 
2004 
 
 
55.5 58.9 61.4 66.1 66.0 54.9 64.7 59.1 52.8 54.9 
2005 
 
 
55.8 
 
57.1 62.6 66.7 65.2 53.3 61.3 54.7 51.3 55.0 
2006 
 
 
53.2 
 
64.5 64.4 63.7 64.7 57.9 60.5 56.3 52.4 56.8 
2007 
 
 
54.4 
 
69.3 64.8 64.5 66.0 57.2  62.7 56.0 52.2 56.2 
2008 
 
 
58.5 
 
69.2 66.2 64.0 66.1 55.5 63.7 55.9 49.7 56.2 
2009 
 
 
57.9 
 
69.7 67.5 65.4 65.8 56.9 64.6 56.7 50.7 56.6 
2010 
 
 
59.0 
 
70.4 67.7 66.1 68.3 55.2 67.6 56.3 50.3 58.0 
2011 
 
 
59.1 
 
70.4 68.5 68.9 67.8 55.1 68.6 56.2 50.5 59.7 
2012 
 
 
57.9 69.4 67.8 69.9 65.3 54.7 68.7 57.1 50.5 58.3 
Economic Freedom Scale from 0 to 100, 0 = no freedom, 100 = perfect freedom 
Source: The Heritage Foundation
99
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Global Influence/ United Nations Voting 
 
The United States wants other states to support the U.S.-led global order, 
particularly during the U.S. War on Terror. While the United States is a military power 
and could conceivably coerce support from other countries, it is the goal of foreign aid to 
increase the U.S.’ soft power. Joseph Nye, a professor and former U.S. government 
official, is the first to coin the term “soft power” in his book Bound to Lead: The 
Changing Nature of American Power.
100
  While soft power is a difficult concept to 
quantify, Nye defines it “as the ability to influence likeness of others. Specifically, a 
county’s […] soft power lies in its ideology, cultural and political values and the ability 
to form international norms and institutions.”101 Nye goes on to note that: 
When countries make their power legitimate in the eyes of others, they encounter 
less resistance to their wishes. If a country’s culture and ideology are attractive, 
others more willingly follow. If a country can shape international rules that are 
consistence with its interests and values, its actions will more likely appear 
legitimate in the eyes of others. If it uses institutions and follows rules that 
encourage other countries to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it 
will not need as many costly carrots and sticks.
102
 
 
Soft power is difficult to measure. While soft power has many expressions, one 
manifestation is through similar voting in the United Nations. While there may be 
extraneous factors influencing a country’s voting decisions, when a country’s votes 
harmonize with the United States’, it is also a likely sign of U.S. influence. By reviewing 
United Nations voting records for the years 2002 through 2012, we can find the degree of 
agreement between aid receiving countries and the United States. Table 4 illustrates the 
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extent to which the case countries and the U.S. have voted together at the U.N. The data 
are comprised of all votes, excluding consensus votes, which is when no country voted in 
opposition to the U.S. vote. 
 
 
Case Country United Nations Voting Scores 
 
Table 4 - U.N. Voting with the U.S. by Country, 2002-2012 
 
YEAR 
 
 
COUNTRY  
  
Egypt 
 
 
Georgia 
 
Israel 
 
Jordan 
 
Mexico 
 
Pakistan 
 
Peru 
 
Philippines 
 
Russia 
 
Zambia 
2002 
 
 
20.0 
 
45.1 92.6 13.5 27.1 19.4 32.9 24.1 30.4 22.4 
2003 
 
 
12.8 
 
47.1 89.7 11.5 20.7 17.9 23.0 17.7 26.4 17.7 
2004 
 
 
8.5 36.7 93.2 16.0 23.0 9.7 25.0 13.0 18.6 12.7 
2005 
 
 
8.9 
 
43.7 90.5 12.5 23.5 8.5 24.7 19.5 21.7 12.8 
2006 
 
 
7.4 
 
40.5 84.2 5.3 23.3 17.6 23.6 16.3 20.5 13.8 
2007 
 
 
6.3 
 
36.4 86.4 9.2 15.8 11.0 16.2 7.9 11.9 5.4 
2008 
 
 
6.7 
 
41.8 87.7 8.3 24.1 18.9 26.3 18.8 17.1 16.0 
2009 
 
 
17.7 
 
64.4 97.0 21.3 36.8 30.0 37.5 30.3 32.2 28.8 
2010 
 
 
31.4 
 
58.9 91.8 33.8 37.5 21.3 39.4 31.3 32.8 33.3 
2011 
 
 
34.8 
 
78.8 92.8 38.6 50.0 22.8 50.0 47.4 47.2 39.5 
2012 
 
 
30.0 59.6 92.3 35.6 39.7 23.0 40.5 36.5 42.9 37.0 
Values are percentages of each case country and U.S. consensus in U.N. voting 
Source: U.S. State Department 
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ANALYSIS 
 
 Using the statistical software program STATA, I am able to conduct a regression 
analysis of the data to determine if U.S. foreign aid has achieved any of the three broad 
U.S. foreign policy objectives. I will test economic aid and military aid simultaneously as 
well as combined in order to parse out any connection between the data. Additionally, 
because we would expect to see the results of aid the year after the aid is given, data for 
the independent variable of aid is lagged by one year from the dependent variable. 
However, foreign aid experts typically expect to see the results of aid five to ten years 
after initiating an aid program. For that reason, a second regression, lagging aid by five 
years, will also be examined. 
For this analysis I will be conducting a least-squares regression at a 95% 
confidence interval. In a least-squares regression analysis at a 95% confidence interval, 
the P-value for a statistically significant relationship between the data would result in 
alpha being less than 0.05. A statistically significant relationship is seen between both 
military and economic aid and economic freedom with a one year lag. Using a five year 
lag, a statistically significant relationship is noted between economic aid and state 
fragility.  
The results of the regression analysis for military and economic aid using a one 
year lag are shown in Table 5. A regression analysis for combined aid (military and 
economic aid summed) with a one year lag is shown in Table 6. Table 7 presents the 
regression analysis for military and economic aid using a five year lag and Table 8 
presents the analysis of combined aid using a five year lag.  
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Regression Analysis Results 
 
Table 5 - Results for Military and Economic Aid for Each Variable (1 Year Lag) 
 
  
STATE FRAGILITY 
 
 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM 
 
U.N. VOTING 
 
 
coefficient 
(standard deviation) 
p-value 
 
coefficient 
(standard deviation) 
p-value 
 
coefficient 
(standard deviation) 
p-value 
 
Military Aid 
 
 
 
.0014 
(.0014) 
0.319 
 
 
-.0074*  
(.0026) 
0.007* 
 
.0034 
(.0083) 
0.679 
Economic Aid 
 
 
-.0006 
(.0007) 
0.379 
 
.0036* 
(.0013) 
0.010* 
-.0016 
(.0043) 
0.707 
Constant 
 
 
10.7883 
(1.9959) 
  0.000 
 
65.3751 
(3.7093) 
0.000 
12.3569 
(11.5657) 
0.288 
N 
 
100 100 100 
R-Squared 
 
0.8114 0.7532 0.8114 
Root MSE 1.9097 3.549 11.066 
     
* denotes statistical significance at the p<0.05 level 
 
 
Table 6 - Results for Combined Aid for Each Variable (1 Year Lag) 
 
  
STATE FRAGILITY 
 
 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM 
 
U.N. VOTING 
 
 
coefficient 
(standard deviation) 
p-value 
 
coefficient 
(standard deviation) 
p-value 
 
coefficient 
(standard deviation) 
p-value 
 
Combined Aid 
 
 
 
-.00004  
(.0004) 
0.930 
 
 
.0003 
(.0009) 
0.678 
 
-.0001 
(.0028) 
0.964 
Constant 
 
 
12.5854 
(1.1424) 
0.000 
 
55.8738 
(2.2234) 
0.000 
16.7022 
(6.5824) 
0.013 
N 
 
100 100 100 
R-Squared 
 
0.8088 0.7255 0.8109 
Root MSE 1.9119 3.7211 11.016 
    
* denotes statistical significance at the p<0.05 level 
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Table 7 - Results for Military and Economic Aid for Each Variable (5 Year Lag) 
 
  
STATE FRAGILITY 
 
 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM 
 
U.N. VOTING 
 
 
coefficient 
(standard deviation) 
p-value 
 
coefficient 
(standard deviation) 
p-value 
 
coefficient 
(standard deviation) 
p-value 
 
Military Aid 
 
 
 
-.0024 
(.0014) 
0.107 
 
 
-.0114 
(.0070) 
0.114 
 
-.0128 
(.0064) 
0.055 
Economic Aid 
 
 
.0010* 
(.0005) 
0.041* 
 
-.0003 
(.0024) 
0.897 
.0017 
(.0022) 
0.449 
Constant 
 
 
15.4286 
(1.9619) 
  0.000 
 
70.2072 
(9.3004) 
0.000 
27.9894 
(8.5499) 
0.002 
N 
 
50 50 50 
R-Squared 
 
0.9580 0.6735 0.9682 
Root MSE 0.9426 4.4686 4.108 
     
* denotes statistical significance at the p<0.05 level 
 
 
Table 8 - Results for Combined Aid for Each Variable (5 Year Lag) 
 
  
STATE FRAGILITY 
 
 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM 
 
U.N. VOTING 
 
 
coefficient 
(standard deviation) 
p-value 
 
coefficient 
(standard deviation) 
p-value 
 
coefficient 
(standard deviation) 
p-value 
 
Combined Aid 
 
 
 
.00004  
(.0004) 
0.303 
 
 
-.0023 
(.0018) 
0.215 
 
-.0009 
(.0017) 
0.580 
Constant 
 
 
11.8430 
(.8476) 
0.000 
 
58.9947 
(3.9892) 
0.000 
13.2777 
(3.6736) 
0.001 
N 
 
50 50 50 
R-Squared 
 
0.9535 0.6584 0.9730 
Root MSE .9787 4.5117 4.2417 
 
    
* denotes statistical significance at the p<0.05 level 
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A statistical analysis of the survey items using the statistical software program 
STATA, as seen in Tables 5 and 6, determines that there is no significant relationship 
between U.S. economic aid, military aid or combined aid after a single year and any of 
the three broad foreign policy objectives, with one exception. That exception is a 
statistically significant relationship between U.S. military and economic aid and the 
outcome variable of economic freedom (Table 5). This relationship reveals that as 
military aid increases, economic freedom decreases and vice versa for economic aid. 
However, the conclusion drawn from these results suggest that the giving of both military 
and economic aid simultaneously cancels out any actual change in economic freedom. 
Tables 7 and 8 show the analysis of a five year lag between the giving of aid and 
the outcome variables using the same statistical software program. As seen in Table 7, 
there is a statistically significant relationship between economic aid and state fragility. 
This would suggest that giving economic aid long-term supports the stability of a state’s 
government. Additionally, while not a statistically significant relationship, it is interesting 
to note that there may be a connection between military aid and U.N. voting. While no 
solid correlation was demonstrated in these data, previous studies have found the giving 
of aid to be directly linked to U.N. voting.
103
  
 
Discussion 
 
Why has aid failed in the immediate-term in achieving the United States’ broad 
foreign policy objectives? For the reason that economic and military aids often run 
counter in their foreign policy goals. While military aid has multiple purposes, one main 
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target is serving the commercial interest of the donor.
104
  Basically, military aid is given 
to support U.S. commercial interests in the manufacture and sale of military equipment 
around the world. While the goal of economic aid is to strengthen beneficiary country 
domestic markets and increase participation in international trade, the expectation of 
military aid is to rule the military market and have the U.S. be the only supplier of 
military equipment. These two forms of aid often run counter in their foreign policy 
goals, and as demonstrated in Table 5, their opposing purposes cause a lack of sound 
results in the overall goals of U.S. aid.  
In the short-run (five-ten years), U.S. foreign policy objectives are still not being 
met by foreign aid. The exception, seen in Table 7, is state fragility. The giving of 
economic aid is linked to decreased state fragility. Nonetheless, this, too, has some 
caveats. While the continual giving of economic aid helps minimize state fragility, this 
does not necessarily support the ultimate goal of having a state remain stable on its own. 
In this case, maintenance of state stability may become dependent on the persistent giving 
of aid.  
While the regression analyses conclude that U.S. aid has little impact in 
accomplishing the United States’ broad foreign policy objectives in the post-9/11 era, aid 
is not without its successes. While it is the goal of aid to support these general foreign 
policy goals, most aid is still given for limited and specific reasons. As seen in the case of 
Egypt and Israel, aid is primarily given to maintain regional stability between Egypt and 
Israel. As no subsequent conflicts have broken out between Egypt and Israel and their 
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bilateral agreements have held strong, U.S. aid appears to be quite successful in this 
endeavor.  
Nonetheless, a re-evaluation of U.S. aid should be conducted to assess what level 
of aid would be sufficient to accomplish these narrow, particular foreign policy 
objectives in order to better spend the U.S. aid budget. Additionally, further research is 
necessary to determine what form of aid or other tool of foreign policy would work best 
at accomplishing the general foreign policy goals of the United States.  
It can be concluded from this analysis that if the U.S. wants to promote economic 
freedom, then economic aid should not be given concurrently with military aid. 
Moreover, the results suggest that the promotion of economic freedom through U.S. 
economic aid is likely to cost a lot to produce even modest changes. As for maintaining 
state stability, the continuation of economic aid would appear to be working toward this 
effort. However, the prolongation of economic aid for the purpose of maintaining a 
foreign state’s stability is not a long-term solution and the U.S. will want to assess what 
other methods might produce similar and more sustainable results.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Global War on Terror, it is argued, has been used to shore up support for the 
U.S. and its efforts to lead the global order.
105
 The United States endeavors to maintain 
the status-quo and uses many avenues to shape the world and continue the existing order. 
The giving of foreign aid is one tool in this effort. Looking at the recent history of U.S. 
aid giving, three general goals emerge: political stability, increased economic 
liberalization and expanding soft power influence in the aid receiving country.  
This study has assessed the success of combined U.S. economic and military aid 
in accomplishing these three general foreign policy objectives and found that aid is a 
weak tool for achieving these goals. On an immediate basis, the giving of economic aid 
does support economic liberalization. However, any substantial increase in economic 
liberalization would be an expensive undertaking for the U.S. and would require the 
relinquishment of the goals for military aid, namely the market domination of U.S. 
military goods and services.  
In the larger view, economic aid also appears to help reduce state fragility. 
However, while economic aid helps minimize state fragility, this does not necessarily 
support the more crucial aim of having a state remain stable on its own. Economic aid in 
this case would be better viewed as a short-term solution to maintaining state stability 
when needed and not as a long-term foreign policy achievement.   
The results of this study suggest that the U.S. should reassess its foreign policy 
goals with respect to foreign aid. While aid has been able to accomplish smaller and more 
direct goals, the giving of aid to achieve political stability, economic liberalization and 
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increased U.S. influence has largely been an expensive letdown. Some recommendations 
for U.S. foreign policy makers would be: 
Recommendation 1: Recognize that aid is not always the most effective tool of 
foreign policy. The United States has a host of tools available for the implementation of 
foreign policy. While aid could be one such instrument, it is not the most effective 
device. If the U.S. wishes for global political stability, paying states to control fragility is 
not a long-term solution. It would be wise to research other methods for promoting 
sustainable state stability.  
Additionally, aid is not always the most valuable means of influence. If the U.S. 
wishes to expand its soft power influence and also persuade states to join the U.S. in its 
endeavors, such as the war on terrorism, the U.S. needs to develop rapport with other 
states. Developing trust and accountability takes time. It is a process that requires the 
donor to be consistent, understanding, and to collaborate with others to achieve the 
desired outcome of both.  
Recommendation 2: Refocus aid for a primary purpose: humanitarian and/or 
developmental goals. U.S. foreign aid policy has shifted considerably and continuously. 
Having a focused direction for aid that is unending would better facilitate meeting the 
goal(s) of aid.  Instead of the U.S. aid budget being spread thin over multiple endeavors, 
having a focused objective for aid would allow for targeted impact. Correspondingly, it is 
important to be patient and consistent. There are no quick fixes in development or 
resolving humanitarian crisis, but having a long-term, steady approach can enable 
continual progress.  
45 
Recommendation 3: Build on existing aid foundations and align them with 
domestic priorities. Rather than throwing out the entirety of foreign aid, policy makers 
need to look at what is already working. Likewise, it must be acknowledged that one size 
does not fit all. There are no perfect policies when it comes to aid. Even while having a 
dedicated purpose, aid must remain flexible and work within the confines of each 
individual context to achieve the greatest impact.  
Recommendation 4: Aid should work from within instead of without. The U.S. 
needs to acknowledge, as a donor, that existing power structures and local politics within 
the recipient country matter. Aid needs to work within the framework of these institutions 
to serve its purpose. While aid policy has the ability to be coercive and prompt change, 
the idea of holding aid hostage needs to be carefully considered.   
Furthermore, it is presumably the goal of every country to do well economically. 
The U.S. must recognize this and find ways to include other states in the U.S.-led global 
economy that produces benefits for all. If the United States wishes for the global 
economy to remain U.S.-led, it must embrace the growing diversity and needs of other 
states.   
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